Ukraine War - NEWS

As a key NATO ally that shares a 332-mile border with Ukraine, Poland has been quietly bracing for the worst. Towns across the country have been setting up accommodations to prepare for the up to 1 million refugees who could arrive if Russian forces, which have now entered Russia’s proxy states in eastern Ukraine, touch off a wider war. After hackers hit several Ukrainian ministries and two major banks in the country last week, Poland’s public administration and security services heightened their own vigilance against potential cyberattacks. Now that a full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine appears more likely by the day, Polish leaders are keenly aware that what happens in the coming weeks will inevitably affect Poland, too.

So far, Warsaw’s diplomatic and military profile in the region has only grown throughout the crisis.

Poland has been the main destination for U.S. troops arriving in Eastern Europe since January: After sending 2,000 soldiers to Poland and Germany in early February, Washington deployed 3,000 additional troops to Poland, including from the 101st Airborne Division. U.S. Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin also announced a $6 billion weapons sale to Warsaw, which will include 250 M1 Abrams tanks, as he visited U.S. troops in Poland last week. On Monday, Washington moved its diplomatic staff in Ukraine to Poland.

As a key NATO ally that shares a 332-mile border with Ukraine, Poland has been quietly bracing for the worst. Towns across the country have been setting up accommodations to prepare for the up to 1 million refugees who could arrive if Russian forces, which have now entered Russia’s proxy states in eastern Ukraine, touch off a wider war. After hackers hit several Ukrainian ministries and two major banks in the country last week, Poland’s public administration and security services heightened their own vigilance against potential cyberattacks. Now that a full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine appears more likely by the day, Polish leaders are keenly aware that what happens in the coming weeks will inevitably affect Poland, too.

So far, Warsaw’s diplomatic and military profile in the region has only grown throughout the crisis.

Poland has been the main destination for U.S. troops arriving in Eastern Europe since January: After sending 2,000 soldiers to Poland and Germany in early February, Washington deployed 3,000 additional troops to Poland, including from the 101st Airborne Division. U.S. Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin also announced a $6 billion weapons sale to Warsaw, which will include 250 M1 Abrams tanks, as he visited U.S. troops in Poland last week. On Monday, Washington moved its diplomatic staff in Ukraine to Poland.

Meanwhile, Poland has been providing Kyiv with vital support. Since December, Polish politicians have been visiting Kyiv to show solidarity with Ukraine; announced plans to send tens of thousands of artillery shells, anti-aircraft weapons, and mortars, among other arms, to the country; and, as of last week, finalized a new tripartite security agreement between Poland, Ukraine, and the United Kingdom that aims to improve trade and defense cooperation between the three countries.

Yet Poland’s importance in the slow-burning crisis may rise still further. Sitting between Russia’s post-Soviet sphere and Western Europe, Poland is no stranger to great-power confrontation. As both a target and vocal opponent of Russian ambitions, NATO’s largest member in Eastern Europe is positioned to play a crucial role in Europe’s security relationship with Russia and become the linchpin of Western efforts to project power in Eastern Europe.

Poland sits on the edges of the farthest western extensions of Russia’s presence in Europe: Russia’s Kaliningrad exclave and Belarus, which has effectively become a Russian proxy state since Belarusian leader Aleksandr Lukashenko called in Russian support against nationwide protests disputing his sham reelection in 2020.

Since then, Russian President Vladimir Putin has used Belarus to threaten Poland. After Warsaw supported and provided refuge to the Belarusian opposition, Lukashenko engineered a migrant crisis in 2021, almost certainly with backing from Moscow, that left thousands of migrants stranded along the Polish—and European Union—border. According to Poland and the EU, Lukashenko’s weaponization of migrants and his concurrent wave of propaganda against Poland constituted hybrid warfare. In addition, Belarusian forces destroyed Polish border barriers, harassed Polish security forces, and allegedly fired blanks at Polish forces—the closest confrontation between a NATO member state and a Russian ally since the end of the Cold War.

Even before the current crisis, Poland, which joined NATO in 1999, had long been at odds with Russia. After occupying Poland for 123 years prior to World War I, Russia invaded Poland again during World War II and installed a puppet communist regime after the war that lasted until 1989. Since then, the two countries have sparred due to Warsaw’s opposition to Putin’s regional posturing and its support for Ukraine’s moves to embrace the West since 2014. “Poland impedes Russia because we have a long history of proximity and we don’t shy away from explaining Russia to the West,” said Radoslaw Sikorski, who served as Poland’s foreign minister and defense minister in past governments and is now a member of the European Parliament.

Now, Poles are increasingly wary of looming threats on their doorstep amid the Russia-Ukraine crisis. Beyond the potential for waves of disinformation, cyberattacks, and more of the kind of hybrid warfare that Poland faced from Belarus last year, Russian forces stationed as close as 124 miles from Warsaw in Belarus have also rattled Poland. These forces are primarily meant to menace Ukraine, but Polish Foreign Minister Zbigniew Rau has called their presence a “great concern.”

Although any Russian attack on Ukraine would have an enormous impact on Poland and the region, “the direct threat against Poland will come from the territory of Belarus, not from the territory of Ukraine,” said Marek Swierczynski, the head of the security desk at the Polish research institution Polityka Insight.

Given the threats posed by a militant, Kremlin-reliant Belarus, and Poland’s aversion to a major conflict breaking out across Ukraine, it appears inevitable that Poland will be forced to become even more of a strategic player in the region. And that’s a role Warsaw clearly wants to take on.

“Poland, from the very beginning of this tension that Russia is evoking, has been trying to play on the international stage very actively,” said Michal Potocki, a journalist with the Polish magazine Dziennik Gazeta Prawna and a lecturer at the University of Warsaw. “The strengthening of democracy in Ukraine, and the strengthening of political pluralism in Ukraine, serves to also strengthen the pro-Western orientation of [Ukraine].”

Creating a prosperous Ukraine free of Russian interventionism is about more than just security for Warsaw. It is also vital to safeguarding economic and social ties between the two countries. Poland is Ukraine’s second-largest trading partner behind China, and as the largest immigrant group in Poland today, Ukrainian residents and laborers have become an integral part of the Polish economy.

And it’s not just Polish policymakers who care about protecting their southeastern neighbor. According to a pan-European poll conducted last month by the European Council on Foreign Relations, 65 percent of Poles said their country should come to Ukraine’s defense if it were attacked by Russia—a much higher percentage than in any other country polled. Poland’s ruling Law and Justice party’s styling of itself as the single-handed defender of Europe from Russian and Belarusian incursions may have contributed to such attitudes.

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Polish President Andrzej Duda and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky hold a press conference following talks on bilateral relations and Ukraine’s ties to Europe at the Presidential Palace in Warsaw on Aug. 31, 2019.

How Poland Turned Ukraine to the West

For Kyiv, Warsaw is a model of what a country can become when it escapes the Russian umbrella.

In addition to bringing Poland closer to its regional allies, Rau visited Moscow last week in his capacity as this year’s chair of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe in hopes of reducing regional tensions. And Poland’s new alliance with Ukraine and the U.K. suggests Warsaw wants to expand its role as a regional node of security cooperation between Western Europe and Ukraine.

Nevertheless, this role has so far grown only outside the institutions of the EU. Even as the current crisis has progressed, Poland’s long-running battles with the EU have persisted, and a European court struck down a Polish legal challenge related to rule-of-law issues last week. According to Sikorski, disagreements of this kind have weakened Poland’s efforts to build alliances within Europe.

Still, amid the crisis, Poland has taken a step back on divisive, internal quarrels in the EU. For instance, Polish President Andrzej Duda has introduced legislation getting rid of controversial judicial reforms, stating that “we don’t need this fight.” “The absolute priority is the security of the continent, the security of the Western world understood broadly, the security of Ukraine, the security of Poland,” Potocki said.

Even if Putin does decide to stop short of open war with Ukraine, the political moment that Poland has found itself in is not one that will pass soon. Expanding Warsaw’s military budget, which the government has pledged to do as it plans to more than double the size of its troops, will allow Poland to become more self-sufficient in its own security in years ahead—as will continued efforts to smooth over the rows that have tarnished its relationship with the EU.

Poland knows it must prepare for a future in which it will have to play a leading role in keeping Putin’s Russia at arm’s length. After all, this crisis will almost certainly not be the region’s last.

As Russia’s war in Ukraine enters its fourth month, calls are growing in Western Europe and the United States for a diplomatic push to end the war. In late May, Italy proposed a four-point peace plan for Ukraine that would culminate in sanctions relief for Russia. Not long after, former U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, speaking at Davos, called on Ukraine to cede territory to Russia and to begin negotiations immediately. And at the beginning of June, French President Emmanuel Macron repeated his call to not “humiliate” Russia. In the halls of power, a consensus seems to be emerging: give Moscow land in exchange for peace.

In Ukraine, however, the opposite view has taken hold. Speaking directly to Kissinger’s comments, President Volodymyr Zelensky retorted that “those who advise Ukraine to give away something to Russia . . . are always unwilling to see ordinary people.” He is joined in this view by most Ukrainians—82 percent of whom, according to a May poll, oppose any territorial concessions. Not surprisingly, a population attacked so brutally and unjustly is decidedly uninterested in rewarding the bully with pieces of its homeland.

Zelensky and the Ukrainian people are right: pressuring Ukraine into a negotiated settlement with territorial concessions would not lead to long-term peace and stability in Europe. Rather, it would reward Russian military aggression in the short term, create a new swath of instability in the heart of Europe, and effectively condone Russian war crimes. A peaceful settlement sounds reasonable in theory. But in practice—in this war, at this moment—it would yield no lasting peace.

THE PROBLEM WITH PEACE

For starters, proposals that Ukraine give up territory to Russian control create a moral hazard. The war in Ukraine is not akin to an eighteenth- or nineteenth-century conflict in which a province might be handed from one country to another without catastrophic consequences for most of the people who live there. Russian President Vladimir Putin’s war is a war of national extermination. He has made no secret of his aim to destroy Ukraine’s cultural and national identity. In the parts of Ukraine they occupy, Russian forces have established “filtration camps” where they question Ukrainians and deport them against their will to Russia. They have committed mass killings and rapes. They have destroyed Ukrainian culture, targeting historical sites, looting museums, and burning books. These tactics are reminiscent of the Stalinist methods employed against Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania in 1940, when the Soviets occupied the Baltic states and sought to erase national identity through mass deportations and forced Russification. Russia’s crimes in Ukraine today are not excesses of war committed in the heat of battle but expressions of national policy.

Those who call on Ukraine to give up territory therefore need to own up to the consequences. Millions of people would never return to their homes. Thousands of civilians would be killed, tortured, and raped. Children would be taken from their parents. The Ukrainians remaining under Russian occupation would be stripped of their national identity and placed under permanent, hostile submission. Professors, teachers, writers, journalists, civic leaders, local activists, and anyone else with what Putin has termed a “Nazi” (read: Ukrainian) identity would probably be harassed and perhaps imprisoned or deported. Accepting further Russian occupation of Ukraine would mean accepting these inevitable moral and ethical consequences. The atrocities would not stop if the fighting ended. To the contrary, surrendering territory to achieve a peace dictated by Moscow would vindicate such tactics and lock in their consequences forever.

JUST A BAND-AID

Advocates of a diplomatic settlement are also unrealistic about its long-term implications for European peace, security, and deterrence. Underlying their proposals is the assumption that a negotiated settlement now would lead to a permanent solution in which Ukraine gives up the territory now under Russian occupation—namely, Crimea, Luhansk, Donetsk, and perhaps Kherson and other territories—and an independent rump state would develop freely to pursue its ambitions of European integration. The idea is to emulate past settlements in which territory was partitioned and stability ensued, such as the division of Germany in 1945 and the Korean armistice of 1953. 

But Ukraine is a profoundly different case. Since his February 24 speech that launched the war, Putin has made explicit in word and deed that he intends to destroy Ukrainian independence writ large. A settlement that surrenders some Ukrainian territory to Russia is unlikely to end Russia’s desires to deny Ukraine true nationhood. The Soviet Union accepted West Germany as a sovereign country during the Cold War, but Putin would never do the same for Ukraine, which he fundamentally does not see as an independent nation.

The Russian-occupied areas of Ukraine, for their part, would in no way resemble East Germany. The Soviets sought to make that country the beacon of state socialism. They wanted it to be communist and under their control, not eliminated or Russified. Even if Russia wanted to rebuild the Donbas or any other part of Ukraine it occupies, it doesn’t have the resources to do so. If ceded to Russia, these territories—already leveled to the ground—would remain no man’s lands: zones of lawlessness and human rights abuses.

A divided Ukraine would not resemble the Korean armistice, either. In that case, on the northern side of the 38th parallel, millions of people suffer under a totalitarian dictatorship while to the south, 50 million South Koreans enjoy freedom, well-being, and a measure of security. But as long as Russia occupies parts of Ukraine, it will seek to undermine any independent Ukrainian government through force, political subversion, and economic pressure.

Russian President Vladimir Putin’s war is a war of national extermination.

Another important difference: to the extent that both the German and Korean solutions worked, they did so thanks to U.S. security guarantees and U.S. troops. West Germany was made a member of NATO, South Korea signed a U.S. defense treaty, and both countries hosted tens of thousands of U.S. troops. In the case of Ukraine, extending NATO membership to the country could in theory back up a territorial settlement. Absent NATO membership, one could imagine a different set of reassurances that could also provide the security underpinnings for long-term stability for a sort of West Ukraine. The United States might, for example, station troops in Ukraine on a long-term basis, and it (and perhaps other countries, as well) might offer a security guarantee on the level of NATO’s Article 5 or the U.S.–South Korean bilateral defense arrangements. But such guarantees remain unlikely.

Western Europe seems no more willing to provide Article 5 guarantees to Ukraine than it did at the 2008 Bucharest summit, where members settled on Ukrainian NATO membership as a long-term objective but laid out no meaningful path to achieve it. Based on our conversations with officials in the Biden administration, even the United States does not seem ready to offer Ukraine security guarantees akin to what it offered West Germany or what it offers South Korea; instead, it is planning to continue to offer only arms and intelligence. Moreover, the Kremlin is likely to insist that any settlement with Ukraine include Ukrainian commitments to give up NATO membership in favor of some sort of neutrality, along with a pledge not to base foreign troops. In any case, those urging Ukraine to surrender territory seldom back up their preferred settlement by insisting that the country be welcomed into NATO or given hard security guarantees by the United States. These omissions inspire little confidence that such proposals are realistic.

At best, Russian-occupied Ukraine would be the site of another so-called frozen conflict, but even that concept is a misnomer and illusion. Frozen conflicts imply a stable permanency, but they are anything but that. As was the case with Luhansk and Donetsk, where the invasion began, gray zones often become launching pads for greater aggression. Moscow’s occupation of Crimea, another so-called frozen conflict, has allowed Russian forces to impose an economic blockade, cutting off vital agricultural exports from Ukraine and igniting a global food crisis. Creating more such gray zones in Ukraine might produce a tenuous short-term stop to the fighting, but as recent history has shown, they would also enable the Kremlin to use these territories to destabilize Ukraine and Europe and rebuild its strength.

BAD INTENTIONS

The diplomatic solution proposed by Italy, to its credit, does not insist on a unilateral Ukrainian surrender of territory. The four-part framework includes a cease-fire and demilitarization; Ukrainian neutrality plus security guarantees; autonomy for Crimea and the Donbas, with both remaining as part of Ukraine; and withdrawal of Russian forces combined with lifting of sanctions. Judging by its public statements in the early weeks of the war, Ukraine might accept something like these terms if they could be realized.

But they are not likely to be. For one thing, in 2013, the Kremlin already had a good deal in Ukraine: the country was officially neutral, its security relations with the West were minimal, and Putin’s man, Viktor Yanukovych, was its president. Evidently, that wasn’t good enough for Putin: he forced Yanukovych to reject a modest trade agreement with the European Union and thus precipitated a democratic uprising. In the years since, Putin’s appetite has only grown. Predictably, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov has already dismissed the Italian proposal.  

Even if the Kremlin announced tomorrow that it accepted a diplomatic framework as the basis for negotiation, there would be good reason to remain skeptical of its chances. The Italian deal, for example, is similar to the now defunct Minsk agreements, which started with a cease-fire, included local control for the Donbas, and ended with restoration of Ukraine’s eastern international boundary. Russia did not take Minsk seriously as anything but a platform to escalate demands. It is unlikely to treat a diplomatic proposal any better today.

Anyone who still has faith in Moscow’s intention to take such frameworks seriously should study its behavior in Syria, where the Russians treated every arrangement as an opportunity to advance its position on the ground. For any negotiations to work, all parties at the table must want a solution, be sincerely engaged in the process, and abide by the ultimate compromise. Putin has shown an inclination to do none of that so far, and he is unlikely to change his behavior as long as he sees any pathway to a win in Ukraine.

TOO EARLY FOR AN ENDGAME

Western policymakers must accept a harsh truth in Ukraine: the war is likely to grind on for some time. At this point in the conflict, the West should think less about what Ukraine should give to Russia and how to avoid humiliating Putin and more about what it can do to put Ukraine in the best possible position. The ultimate argument of those who wish Ukraine to unilaterally surrender land is that the country cannot prevail in the war—that as The New York Times editorial board put it, regaining territory “is not a realistic goal.”

But those who doubt Ukraine’s capabilities should consider how much the country has accomplished so far. Just as initial assumptions of a quick Russian victory were wrong, current assumptions of a slow but unstoppable Russian advance may be off, too. Ukrainian offensives to regain territory in the south and east of the country may prove difficult. But Russia, with its limited forces, may not be able to hold all the territory it has taken. Nobody knows what the fortunes of war may bring. In private conversations with the two of us, senior U.S. military and civilian officials have shared mixed views of how the battle is likely to go and acknowledged that they are uncertain themselves. Uncertainty is a questionable basis on which to make weighty decisions that have baleful consequences for millions of people—decisions such as urging Ukraine to give up territory or pressuring it to stop fighting. At this stage, there is no basis to allow Putin to win at the negotiating table what he has failed to achieve on the battlefield. 

The goal for the West is not to convince or pressure Ukraine to give up.

Ukrainian military success is not inevitable. But it is possible. Putin will not be impressed by firm speeches from Western leaders. What he may well respect, however, is a defeat on the ground, which could convince him to negotiate a settlement that he could portray through his propaganda machine as a victory. Putin is counting on the West to lose patience in a long war and capitulate as energy and food prices rise. And although the Russian people are famed for their ability to endure hardship, they were promised a quick “special military operation”—not years of conflict that make it difficult to live normal lives. Their patience will wear thinner if Russia loses on the battlefield.

The United States, Europe, and Ukraine’s other friends have a responsibility to help Ukraine prevail commensurate with that possibility. The goal now for the West is to thwart an adversary—not to convince or pressure Ukraine to give up. That means sending more arms to Ukraine and putting more economic pressure on Russia.

Such a plan does not rule out negotiations. Zelensky and his government have not done so. In fact, they showed more commitment to negotiations in the early weeks of the war than the Kremlin did. The time for negotiations may come—which is why the job now is to put Ukraine in the most favorable position possible in anticipation of that moment so that it has the best options available.

As long as Ukrainians are willing to fight for their homeland and all of Europe, it is the West’s duty to support them. Peace may sound like an appealing talking point, but Ukrainians know that it cannot come at any price. Western policymakers should listen.

Russian President Vladimir Putin, right, with German Chancellor Angela Merkel during a joint news conference in Moscow’s Kremlin on Nov.16, 2012. Throughout their relationship as world leaders, German Chancellor Angela Merkel and Russian President Vladimir Putin have shared an understanding. After all, Putin served as a KGB officer in Germany from 1985 to 1990.

“When Putin and Merkel meet, they sometimes speak in German (he’s better in her language than she is in his), and Putin corrects his own interpreter to let Merkel know that nothing is lost on him,” George Packer of The New Yorker wrote in a profile of Merkel.

“Putin’s brand of macho elicits in Merkel a kind of scientific empathy.”

The profile shows how tensions between the two leaders have been brewing for several years, most recently with Russia’s incursions into Ukraine.

During discussions about energy supplies at Putin’s home in Sochi back in 2007, the Russian president called his black lab, Koni, into the room with Merkel. From The New Yorker (emphasis added):

“As the dog approached and sniffed her, Merkel froze, visibly frightened. She’d been bitten once, in 1995, and her fear of dogs couldn’t have escaped Putin, who sat back and enjoyed the moment, legs spread wide. ‘I’m sure it will behave itself,’ he said. Merkel had the presence of mind to reply, in Russian, ‘It doesn’t eat journalists, after all.’ …”

“Later, Merkel interpreted Putin’s behavior. ‘I understand why he has to do this — to prove he’s a man,’ she told a group of reporters. ‘He’s afraid of his own weakness. Russia has nothing, no successful politics or economy. All they have is this.'”

In 2007, Merkel met with Putin — and his dog Koni. The Kremlin has used animals to antagonize world leaders before. Putin once played the “my dog is bigger than your dog” game with then-President George W. Bush. The incident actually served as

inspiration for one of Bush’s paintings. 

The Russian president, who filmed his own instructional jiu-jitsu video, makes no secret of his physical prowess. Through various propaganda events portraying his manliness, Putin markets himself as a tough guy running an even tougher country.

Christina Sterbenz contributed to this story.

France and Germany sold £230million worth of military hardware to Moscow which was likely used in Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, according to an EU analysis.

It should have been impossible to do so owing to an EU embargo that banned selling arms to Russia following the 2014 annexation of Crimea.

Last month, it was discovered that France, Germany and Italy used a loophole in the ban.

They were just three of at least 10 EU member states to export almost €350million (£293million) in equipment that included missiles, rockets, guns and bombs.

It was reported by The Telegraph that 78 per cent of this total was supplied by French and German firms.

 

Service members of pro-Russian troops are seen atop of an armoured vehicle during Ukraine-Russia conflict in the southern port city of Mariupol

The EU banned ‘the direct or indirect sale, supply, transfer or export of arms and related material of all types, including weapons and ammunition, military vehicles and equipment, paramilitary equipment, and spare parts therefore, to Russia’ eight years ago.

However, countries were able to sell hundreds of millions of pounds worth of kit to Russia despite the ban using a backdoor technicality that permitted contracts signed before August 1, 2014, or additional contracts that would help conclude those deals.

France was responsible for making €152 million in sales as part of 76 export licences.

Earlier this month, it was revealed that the European Union had sent almost €1billion to Russia each day for energy since the war in Ukraine began.

German Chancellor Olaf Scholz has faced sharp criticism for failing to deliver heavy weapons to the besieged country, such as tanks and howitzers, to fend off savage Russian attacks.

The leader said he feared that providing Ukraine with tanks could spark a nuclear war.

 

German Chancellor Olaf Scholz says he fears providing Ukraine with tanks could spark a nuclear war

Other Western allies have stepped up their military shipments to Volodymyr Zelensky‘s forces but Scholz has held firm in his bid not to upset Vladimir Putin.

Instead, on Tuesday, he said Germany would provide Ukraine with £830million to buy their own weapons.

Asked in an extensive interview published on Friday why he thought delivering tanks could lead to nuclear war, he said there was no rule book that stated when Germany could be considered a party to the war in Ukraine.

It comes as Russia revealed plans to seize Ukraine’s entire southern coast and hinted at future military action in Moldova to protect ‘oppressed’ Russian speakers.

 

Other Western allies have stepped up their military shipments to Volodymyr Zelensky ‘s forces but Scholz has held firm in his bid not to upset Vladimir Putin

The deputy commander of Russia’s central military district, Rustam Minnekayev, said Russia planned to forge a corridor between Crimea, the Black Sea peninsula which Russia annexed in 2014, and the Donbas in eastern Ukraine.

The suggestion by a senior Russian official that Moscow needs to defend supporters in a nearby country is a chilling echo of its previous justification for invading Ukraine.

It would mean an extended war to the west of annexed Crimea, where Putin’s sea power is diminished after the sinking of the Moskva.

Russian forces already occupy most of the territory there and, as Western officials have conceded, they are in a position to achieve their military objectives.

 

It comes as Russia revealed plans to seize Ukraine’s entire southern coast and hinted at future military action in Moldova to protect ‘oppressed’ Russian speakers

Boris Johnson said the UK is looking at sending British tanks to Poland – after it was revealed Ukrainian troops are in Britain being trained for the first time since the start of the Russian invasion.

Speaking during a news conference in New Delhi, where he held talks with Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi, the Prime Minister today said the Government was contemplating sending Challenger 2 tanks to eastern Europe to replace Soviet-era T-72 tanks the Poles are shipping to Ukraine.

Mr Johnson told reporters: ‘I think perhaps what I haven’t said publicly before is we’re also looking more at what we can do to backfill in countries such as Poland who may want to send heavier weaponry to help defend the Ukrainians.

‘So we’re looking at sending tanks to Poland to help them as they sending some of their T-72s to Ukraine.’

The Challenger 2 tank has been the mainstay of the British Army since the 1990s and saw action in the Iraq War. The 64-tonne vehicles are due to go out of service in 2025, but the Army still has a fleet of more than 200.

 

The Challenger 2 tank has been the mainstay of the British Army since the 1990s and saw action in the Iraq War. The 64-tonne vehicles are due to go out of service in 2025, but the Army still has a fleet of more than 200

 

Britain’s Prime Minister Boris Johnson and his Indian counterpart Narendra Modi at Hyderabad House in New Delhi