Towards new Alliances able to maintain a real condition of Peace

Table of Contents

THE BASIC PROBLEM: LACK OF AWARENESS OF WHAT A TRUE CONDITION OF PEACE IS (the illusion of immediate relief)

The Russia-Ukraine conflict derives from mistakes made in the management of international policies practiced after Warld War II. Errors due to which the leaders of the Western Nations have not been able to maintain an effective condition of peace.

The problem stems from the fact that

choices have always been made
that privileged a condition of Peace
that was only apparent
instead of a condition of real, solid peace.

This illusory condition is that comfortable condition that allows human beings to feel relieved for having avoided immediate suffering (by avoiding facing the real problem they face). In this way, the human being experiences a condition of stress that does not allow him to reason as a responsible adult, or rather does not allow him to guess the further problems that will develop if he does not intervene effectively on what is in front of him (as happens when a disease caused by bad habits is developing, and one does not intervene with ridiculous justifications).

In this case it was a question of avoiding confronting effective opposition to the problem of the development of a plan for the invasion of neighboring territories by Putin, a plan that has been evident for more than twenty years (thanks to Putin’s own declarations, and in crimes against humanity – no less evident than those that later emerged in Ukraine – which he carried out with “military operations” in Chechnya, Georgia and Syria).

In other words, the problem is that this condition of seeking immediate relief leads the human being not to be able to develop a fundamental process for the well-being of the person, and for the proper functioning of governmental organizations: risk assessment.

That is, in the case of Ukraine, it would be necessary to evaluate not only the risks of choosing to intervene against Putin, but also those related to non-intervention.

The current problem that the West has to face with the Russia-Ukraine war lies in the fact that in these 20 years the National and Global administrations for reasons of political expediency have indulged this unconscious request for relief in not addressing the problems that arise in front of them: in order to obtain the consent of the citizens (in order not to lose the subsequent elections) the Governors have chosen to let the problem of military attacks on Putin develop away from everyone’s eyes.

In this way, Western governments have passed for a real Peace what is in reality an “armed peace”: a stalemate, a suspension of international policies for the defense of the global political balance in which the most astute countries – with less scruples – have been able to develop their projects for world domination (these are countries in which public opinion is enslaved, with methods of repression of totalitarian propaganda, to governments)

One of the justifications for this choice of non-intervention was that of being protected by the “nuclear deterrent” (a justification that proved to be baseless when Putin threatened the world to start a nuclear war if his plan of invasion of Ukraine) <see text “Post-Cold War: Towards a new form of deterrence (beyond the cold war)”>

The condition of the West’s unawareness

The underlying problem in Putin’s aggression against Ukraine therefore lies in the West’s refusal to see how things actually stood.

Now it is necessary to overcome this condition of unawareness in which a large part of the Western population is still confined. An unawareness that today afflicts:

– the populations, which, even with the emergence of strong evidence of the need to intervene to stop Putin, continue to argue that they want to maintain the current condition of illusory Peace (without realizing that in this way Putin is allowed to reach a position of increasing global power).

(obviously it must be taken into account that the situation is now delicate, and it is necessary to act judiciously in order not to push Putin to use nuclear weapons).

– Leaders, rulers who for reasons of political expediency (or because they are unable to see things as they are) still do not support Ukraine effectively after weeks of war.

The lack of a historical memory leads to the development of problems already had in the past

The problem of the war in Ukraine derives, among other things, from the fact that what History teaches us through other similar events in the past has not been taken into account.

We are talking about those moments in History in which the same mistake was made of thinking that a certain type of treaty with countries that had committed war crimes could maintain a solid Peace, and which instead led to the development of new serious armed conflicts.

This mistake has been made several times in the last century: with the League of Nations created after WW II, with the agreements made with Hitler with the “Munich Agreement” (a case practically identical to that of the annexation of Crimea by Putin, the Dombass “liberation” war, and the subsequent invasion of Ukraine), and subsequently with the UN (which replaced the League of Nations after its failure) and with NATO.

The current problem is that the same mistake is being made in dealing with the war in Ukraine, that is, the organizations that have so far failed (which have not been able to maintain a condition of real peace, and have allowed a Great Power like Russia to gain more and more power over the West to the point of committing a genocide of the citizens of a European Western Democracy).

Note that a similar case may be faced in the short term, given China’s claims of “annexation” of Taiwan, which none of these organizations appear to be able to prevent.

It is therefore necessary, among other things,

reflect on what are
the factory defects of these organizations,
and therefore find valid alternatives to them.

The inability of organizations such as the UN, NATO and the EU to maintain a political balance between the nations has emerged clearly in the case of Russia’s aggression against Ukraine: within them there are members who due to their interests personal problems prevent the development of real solutions.

● in the case of NATO, the factory defect is that it is based on a concept of Peace as an armed peace that allows the totalitarian country to develop precisely those plans that the Organization wanted to stop.

One of NATO’s misconceptions is the choice of a nuclear deterrent, which the war in Ukraine has proved to be totally ineffective. Another mistake (this also applies to EU) is to have members who are blackmailed by Russia for gas supplies (like Germany). <see text “Post-Cold War: Towards a new form of deterrence (beyond the cold war)”>

● in the case of the UN, this organization has proved to be absolutely powerless in the case of the invasion of Ukraine, basically because of the absolute power held in it, with the right of veto, by the autocratic regimes. <see external article “Ukraine war: Rockets hit Kyiv as UN chief admits failings – BBC News“>

The paradox of the UN is to want to defend the democratic order of the world through an organization that is not democratic at all.

That is, in UN decisions are not taken with a democratic vote, the majority does not count, because Some states – such as Russia and China – can make decisions that apply to everything (by exercising the right of veto, they can block any UN initiative).

TOWARDS A NEW KIND OF INTERNATIONAL ALLIANCE

In order to maintain an effective global political balance
it is necessary to create a new type of alliance that is more functional in today’s times.

Alliances that make it possible to overcome the problems that, in fact, prevent the current Alliances from achieving effective results.

Beyond the cold war mentality

The first thing to do is to overcome the mentality that has guided the international alliances up to now: the conception of the cold war.

The problem is that

with the Cold War it was thought to neutralize the aims of world domination by the autocratic superpowers
on a purely military level
(of “end of the world” armaments)

(when it is seen that that kind of armaments it is totally unsuccessful since they have served no purpose to prevent the inaction of Ukraine – and they seem to be of no use to prevent the program already announced by China to “annex” Taiwan)

Today it is therefore necessary to adapt to the times:

in an age where everything is based on global capitalism,
economic “weapons” are stronger than military armaments

(that as can be seen in other points, military armaments remain, but become radically different in nature).

From a military point of view, it is a question of defining a new dimension in the management of global political equilibrium in which Peace is no longer maintained because the “enemy” is aware of the fact that if it attacks a Western country, it risks a nuclear attack. But a dimension in which world political equilibrium is maintained by deterrence based on the knowledge that whenever it tries to break the equilibrium in its favor – for example by invading sovereign countries – it finds local armed resistance that makes it impossible to achieve the its objective (a resistance which this time is supported by the other Powers in an indirect way, as it was for Ukraine).

Here, therefore, in the new dimension of maintaining international political equilibrium, deterrence is developed through a set of non-military forces, based on an economic level, integrated with new methods of armaments.

But weapons strategies are no longer targeted at a global level (as in the case of nuclear deterrents), but are focused at the local level <see text “Post-Cold War: New ways of using weapons (local strategies)”>

The nuclear deterrent of the Cold War showed its paradoxical aspect: based on it, autocratic countries were allowed to develop for decades precisely those plans for world domination that they wanted to neutralize with the nuclear deterrent (see Russia with Ukraine and China with Taiwan ).

It is therefore now necessary to go beyond the dimension of the Cold War. In a certain sense, it is a question of moving to an even colder war in which, with new instruments (economic and military)

we are able to operate so that
the simple setback
stalemate so far by powers such as Russia and China
does not turn into a checkmate.

The need to go beyond current alliances (UN and NATO)

It is therefore, at the basis of everything, to create new types of alliances that replace those of the cold war (UN, NATO, etc …), which have completely failed in the case of Ukraine.

These Alliances must operate largely on the economic level (of the global market): in the preventive phase them must be able to establish limits in the actions of autocratic countries that prevent them from gaining greater power (which Russia and China did in the recent decades). But these alliances also define a more decisive economic intervention plan in the event that the situation becomes particularly critical (as was the case when Putin amassed his army on the border with Ukraine).

Obviously, a “counterattack” phase is also defined: the effectiveness of deterrence also depends on having a military intervention plan in cases of attack by autocratic Countries of which the latter are aware (as illustrated in the article “Post-Cold War: New ways of using weapons”, however, it is a radically different type of military intervention from the one feasible today by NATO: today it is possible to defend the world political equilibrium protecting each state locally).

The new type of alliances must be radically different from those on which the UN and NATO are based: they must be more “dynamic”, so as to be defined ad hoc on the basis of each specific situation.

For example, it is necessary that the agreements are no longer stipulated by two “blocs” (bilateral free-trade agreements), but are “multilateral” (such as so-called multilateral free-trade agreements, which are stipulated between several countries).

The new alliances must integrate within themselves some aspects of the current alliances such as the G7, the WTO, the OECD, the World Trade Organization, the International Court of Justice.

In this case, a substantial difference lies in the fact that the Alliance is no longer based solely on economic issues – definition of quotas, tarifs, sanctions – but, since in this case it is a question of developing a deterrent effect against any threats by of authoritarian States, the economic, military and justice aspects are strongly integrated in the new type of alliance (it is important for the potential aggressor to know that processes such as those that led to the death sentence of Milosevic and Saddam can be instituted against him).

As we see in the next chapter, these are agreements created ad hoc for specific, dynamic cases (they can change according to the situation).

The characteristics of Alliances in step with the times

One of the problems of the current Alliances that emerged with the Russia-Ukraine conflict is the presence of unreliable members who undermine the Alliance’s plans (these are, as we have seen, allies who refuse to intervene effectively in matters of of personal interests).

It is therefore necessary, upstream of everything, to clarify that in order for an alliance to function it must:

● have a solid cohesion

A strong cohesion of the Allies
only occurs when there is a strong
community of important (vital) interests to defend.

Unreliable allies make the Alliance useless: it can provide Western nations with the false security of being able to stem the expansionist aims of the Autocracies, when instead at the right moment it fails in its objectives.

The problem is that without a strong communion of interests (vital for the nation) it is not possible to have allies of whom there is the certainty that they operate in the direction of the goals set by the Alliance.

This emerged, among other things, from the fact that France, Germany and Italy sent arms to Russia despite the embargo; and that subsequently Germany will hesitate in making itself available to supply arms to Ukraine.

Note that we are talking above all about the preventive phase: a deterrent that weakens the aspirations of an Authoritarian State to escalate power. And therefore this potential enemy:

– must know that the alliance has no major weaknesses (as a nation that depends on this enemy for its energy survival can be).

– must not receive preventive aid which would strengthen its military power.

Both situations are well represented by the case of Germany, which helped Russia strengthen its army, and placed itself in a position of subjection by becoming dependent on Russian gas supplies.

The defining qualities of an effective alliance are:

● common interest (and absence of forms of dependence on potentially aggressive countries).

This interest must be vital for the nation, since when it comes to intervening in the event of aggression, the nation must be highly motivated to intervene with actions that are very costly and highly risky.

Recall that Germany not only actually continued to finance the Russian Army during the war (in January 2022 € 2.6 billion for oil and gas imports). But later, when some nations began supplying arms to Ukraine, Germany sent only 5,000 helmets (which Ukraine rightly considered to be a mockery). And he also prevented the Allies from supplying Ukraine with equipment built in Germany.

Without the certainty that a nation will intervene in case of need, there can be no alliance. Germany should never have been included in a coalition aimed at stemming Russia’s expansionist aims (it was a bit like bringing China into an alliance aimed at fighting Russia).

For this reason, as we see in other points, the current Alliances are destined to fail, and it is necessary to find new formulas, with more dynamic Organizations: in the new context a country like Germany must have the possibility to enter the alliance from the moment to which he demonstrates to implement a plan of independence from Russia, and intervenes, for example with sanctions and military aid.

Some ancillary considerations:

– To intervene effectively means to intervene “in time”: but in the case of the war in Ukraine we have seen how most of the allies have remained at the level of declaration of intent, allowing the situation to evolve in a tragic way for it.

Ukraine was saved from the total catastrophe only by “a miracle”: despite the fact that nothing else could be foreseen than a total capitulation, the Ukrainians managed to beat the Russian “David” with simple weapons (the various world organizations have therefore operated in direction of a defeat of Ukraine, both when it came to preventing aggression and when it came to resisting the invading army – the only exception was, in the first and most critical phase, the UK).

That is to say

the problem that needs to be highlighted
is that the West
was already ready to accept the victory of Russia.

– In cases of conflicts like the Russia-Ukraine one, there are no neutral countries. A country that declares its neutrality (both economically and military), as happened in the UN votes, actually gives its assent to the crime it is committing, and in this way favors a stalemate in the conflict (condition in which the authoritarian Regimes have the possibility to continue developing their plans).

The “neutral” countries should be aware that due to their position they will in any case be held responsible for the damage suffered by the attacked country: in this way it would create a deterrent against countries which, declaring themselves neutral, allow the aggressors to develop their plans.

● the interest must be a “defensive” interest

Obviously, adherence to the Alliance must not be motivated by expansionist aims (neither at the military nor at the economic level).

● have a position of strength (non-dependence/real sovereignty)

The Alliance works only if it has a position of strength to be able to deal effectively with the authoritarian states whose expansion it wants to oppose.

A position of strength can only be had if the conditions exist for:

● non-dependence (allied nations are effectively sovereign nations).

Since the aim is the defense of Democracy, obviously it must be an Alliance of sovereign (democratic) Nations.

The problem is that a state that places itself in a condition of subjection to an authoritarian state effectively loses its sovereignty (the sovereignty of a country is either absolute, or it doesn’t exist). <see external article “Independence | The Princeton Encyclopedia of Self-Determination“>

For this reason it is necessary that the Allies, at the very least, do not depend for some vital reason on an authoritarian country.

For example, in the conflict between the West and Putin, effective support from Germany should not have been expected, which was heavily dependent (blackmailed) on Russia due to gas supplies (it lost its sovereignty when it allowed the Russia to create the North Stream, and to rely on it for its own gas supply).

Nor can US support for a possible Taiwanese attack from China be expected, as the US is heavily dependent on China for much of its supply chain.

Reflect on the fact that this means that Germany and the US are no longer a true Democracy, as their parliament will always be required to privilege relations with China over that with the Electors.

● existence of an effective intervention plan to be implemented in the event that the situation becomes critical.

The deterrent effect derives precisely from the fact that the autocratic countries know that in the event of their attack, the Alliance immediately starts with a “counterattack” plan.<see “Post-cold war: the need to define new methods and strategies to maintain or restore peace: peace enforcement phase”>