Ukraine can only win the war if it operates
(immediately, and more effectively than today)
on two levels:
● military level: with “indirect” aid (supplies of weapons and “consultancy”) sufficient to defeat Russia on the ground (which is not happening at all).
<see GCW article “The shift in the concept of war and arms“>
<see GCW article “The need to innovate the concept of armaments as a deterrent“>
.
● political/economic level: with strategies such as sanctions and embargoes (which have never been implemented sufficiently to put Russia in difficulty).
<see GCW article “The measures that we can (and must) take“>
● military level (the two phases of the war):
To understand why Ukraine is losing the war at the beginning of summer 2022 it is necessary to understand that there were two phases of the war:
1) phase 1 (attempt to occupy Kyiv by Russia): Ukraine, by forcing the Russians to withdraw from the North (Kiev) has shown that when it fights with adequate weapons it can win: in this phase light weapons and guerrilla tactics were needed .
2) phase 2 (attack by Russia in the Donbass); in this phase the fighting methods are radically different: the Russians bomb the territory from afar, and when it is “cleared” they advance. In this case, in order not to be defeated, it is necessary to have long-range weapons that allow you to:
– destroy the enemy positions from which the rockets depart.
– hit, behind enemy lines, the structures through which the Russians supply the first line of vehicles, armaments, ammunition, fuel, etc …
In the absence of this possibility, the Russian army ends up prevailing over the Ukrainian one (one of the problems of Ukraine is that it is now short of soldiers, while Russia can recruit “indefinitely” on its vast territory)
Obviously once “the damage is done”, ie the Russians have conquered the Donbass, it is necessary to start over from phase 1 (“guerrilla”) to push the Russians out of the Donbass.
.
The fact is that (probably excluding the UK)
the West has no intention of defeating Putin’s Russia:
that is, it does not understand how it is not possible to negotiate any form of Peace with Putin. <see GCW article “With Putin in power, nothing positive can be done (the Putin’s fall)“>
That is, the Great Powers expect Ukraine to negotiate a Peace in which Putin keeps the conquered territories (a situation in which Putin would actually continue to threaten to invade the rest of the Ukrainian territory). <*** see article in .. synopsis in development “the false concept of peace .. ***>
.
For these reasons, if wants to win the war so that it can resume a normal life, Ukraine must stop pitying aid to world organizations (NATO, EU, etc.), which will never arrive.
Ukraine must instead create an alliance
with other countries
that were somehow part of the USSR,
ie who are well aware of the fact that if Russia wins in Ukraine, they are destined to do the same. <see GCW text “The need for a preliminary alliance with countries threatened by Russia“>
.
In the current situation, the critical points are:
● Ukraine is denied its right of defense
Today Ukraine is denied a fundamental right such as that of responding to unprovoked violence with more violence sufficient to neutralize the aggressor: that is
the attacked person has
the right to use any tool to be able to defeat
those who try to kill him.
<see, on the question of the use of force for defense, my texts “The question of legitimate defense” and “An analysis of human factors related to violence events”>
● the West does not understand that paradoxically with a defeated Putin there would be great advantages for everyone
– if it does not defeat Russia in this war (to the point of bringing about a fall of Putin), the West will not only always remain under Russia’s blackmail, but it will also give the green light to China (which is much more powerful and dangerous than Russia) in its policy of military expansion (primarily with the “annexation” of Taiwan).
– if instead it were more committed to defeating Putin’s Russia, the West would get a much better situation than the current one, since at which point Russia would be greatly downsized, and for some years subjected to a regime of control by the Great Powers (as happened, for example, for Germany after WW I). In this situation, the West would no longer be subjected to Putin’s blackmail, for example for gas supplies. <see GCW article “The sharp downsizing of post-Putin Russia (Russia will no longer be a problem for the west, but an advantage)“>
.
Among other things, from the military point of view, it is necessary to take into account that this conflict has shown that the nuclear threat from the autocratic powers such as Russia can be circumvented by providing “indirect aid” to the attacked state.<see GCW article “The shift in the concept of war and arms“>
Furthermore, it is necessary to consider that the nuclear deterrent on the part of the West, on which NATO is essentially based, has fallen, which therefore becomes obsolete. <see GCW text “The fall of the nuclear deterrent taboo: the possibility of defining a deterrent substantially different from the nuclear one“>
● political/economic level
The defeat of Putin’s Russia is not a question that can be achieved simply by fighting the Russian army, but
in addition to the military level,
it is necessary to act
on the economic, political and judicial levels.
.
For example, these are sanctions that no one seriously wanted to apply, neither when it came to preventing the invasion of Ukraine, nor when the massacres that Russia committed on Ukrainian territory should have been prevented.
Or the trials of those responsible for crimes against humanity, which would serve to inhibit these perpetrators (and allied countries) from continuing to serve Putin.
<see GCW text “Solutions for the West: how to definitively neutralize Russia” >
